Market work per person of working age differs widely across the OECD countries and there have been some significant changes in the last forty years. How to explain this pattern? Taxes are part of the story but much remains to be explained. If we include all the elements of the social security systems like early retirement benefits, sickness and disability benefits and unemployment benefits, then we can capture some aspects of the overall pattern but still a lot remains unexplained. The story favoured by Alesina et al. (CEPR DP.5140, 2005) is that the nexus of strong unions, generous welfare and social democracy implies both high taxes and pressure in favour of work-sharing in response to adverse shocks. This story, however, falls foul of the simple fact that most Scandinavian countries now do much more work than the French and Germans despite having stronger unions, more generous welfare, higher taxes and more social democracy. Ultimately, we are forced into the position that there is no simple story. Some of the broad patterns can be explained but there remain country specific factors which are hard to identify but lead to substantial differences from one country to another.
Introduction
In the early 1970s in France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), more or less the same proportion of the population of working age were actually working (65-70 per cent). And, on average, they were working roughly the same number of hours per year . By contrast, in Sweden, more people were working (74 per cent) but much shorter hours per year on average (around 1650 in 1973) . In Italy, many fewer people were working (55 per cent) but about the same average hours (1868 in 1970) .
Three decades later some things have changed a lot, others very little. In France and Germany, average employment rates have fallen a little and average hours per year have fallen dramatically to just over 1400 hours.
In the UK employment rates are much the same but average annual hours have fallen slowly but steadily to below 1700 hours. In the US, the employment rate has risen a little and average annual hours have fallen a little. Interestingly, US employees now work more hours per year, on average, than employees in any of the rich countries of the OECD 1 . Little has also changed in Sweden over the last thirty years, with the employment rate remaining high and annual hours falling only very slightly. Italy also still has an exceptionally low employment rate but annual hours here have fallen a fair bit (to around 1600) but not to the levels reached in France and Germany.
Overall, as we shall see, the picture with regard to market work is quite complicated. Generally, the Scandinavians, along with the Dutch and Swiss have the highest employment rates. The Americans, Australians and Japanese work more hours per year than the rest. The Southern Europeans (and the Belgians) generally have the lowest employment rates but not the lowest annual hours which may be found in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. Adding employment and hours together, we find that Americans, Australians and New Zealanders are the hardest workers, on average, and the French, Italians and Belgians work least hard 2 . The hardest working countries work about 40 per cent more than the least hard working.
The fact that this number is so large has instigated a significant body of research which has often focused on why, in particular, Americans work so much harder than the average European. An empirical overview may be found in Nickell (1997) (Table 2 and Table 7 , col. 3) and this suggests that employment protection, taxes and unco-ordinated unions tend to be associated with lower labour input. On top of this, there is a great deal of empirical evidence on the determinants of overall employment rates including Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2002) and Nickell et al. (2003) . By and large, they come to similar conclusions, namely that unions, taxes and employment protection are associated with lower employment rates but if union activity is co-ordinated, the impact of unions and taxes is moderated. Furthermore, there is some evidence that low levels of competition in product markets is also associated with low employment rates.
More recently, Prescott (2004) argued that taxes are the key, explaining more or less all the variations in labour input across countries. Davis and Henrekson (2004) also emphasise the importance of taxes. Both these papers echo the results of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) who find that labour taxes can explain most of the fluctuations in unemployment in those countries which do not have co-ordinated pay bargaining. This strong emphasis on the role of labour taxes has been criticised on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the bulk of the cross-country evidence, basically because of omitted variable bias , or on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the evidence on labour supply elasticities . Alesina et al. (2005) then go on to note that labour inputs have fallen especially in countries characterised by strong unions, extensive welfare, high taxation and social democratic governments. As they remark "The bottom line is that hours worked fell in countries that can be characterised
by the Continental European model and did not fall in the countries with the American model (with Britain and Ireland in between)" (p.23). The basic argument is that trade unions respond to adverse shocks by trying to protect employees, pressing for work sharing as well as employment protection more generally, which tends ultimately to reduce overall labour input. This is reasonably plausible although the fact that Sweden, the home of social democracy, strong unions and the welfare state, has seen only very modest reductions in labour input over the last thirty years gives pause for thought. Furthermore, Australia, where over 80% of individuals still have their pay determined by union bargaining, has seen little or no reduction in labour input. By contrast, in the UK, where both union membership and coverage have collapsed since 1980, annual working hours have fallen by 250 hours (14%) since 1973, whereas hours in Sweden fell by a mere 79 over the same period.
In the light of this, it is perhaps worth pursuing the forces underlying fluctuations in the volume of market work per capita a little further. In the next section, we look at the current overall picture and how it divides into annual hours and employment rates. We then look at the history of both these, emphasising the huge variations across the different countries.
In Section 3, we focus on changes in the participation rates of different sub-groups of the population, notably, prime-age men and women as well as older men. We also consider overall unemployment rates. In Section 4, we analyse annual working hours, trying to explain the large differences in the changes since the early 1970s. Finally, in Section 5, we summarise our findings and provide a synthesis of the various explanations of changes in labour input over the last thirty years.
The Overall Picture
In holidays, what stands out is that these are between two and four weeks lower in the US than in any of the other countries. This is possibly due to the differences in data sources, but it is also consistent with the fact that many workers in the US only have one or two weeks paid vacation per year, which would be illegal in nearly all OECD countries.
Unfortunately, we do not have comparable data for other non-European countries but we do know that Australian workers, for example, have a legal minimum of 5.8 weeks holiday and vacation time each year (see Table 15 , below).
Other absences are a residual and consist mainly of sickness or maternity leave. There is a good deal of variation here which may, in part, be due to measurement error. The data in two tables in the Appendix present some alternative numbers which again show significant variations in sickness and maternity leave. These we investigate further below.
Overall, we see that annual holidays and vacations are much the same in most countries with the notable exception of the United States. On top of this there are wide variations in weeks of other absence, mainly sickness and maternity leave.
Some History
Having seen how labour inputs vary across countries, it is worth looking at how employment rates and annual hours worked have changed over the last three or four decades. Starting with employment rates, a striking feature of the numbers in Table 3 is that in the early 1970s, the pattern of employment rates across countries was much the same as it is today. The
Scandinavian countries plus Switzerland have always had the highest employment rates and still do. Spain, Italy and Belgium have always had the lowest employment rates and still do. Some countries have seen significant increases, most notably the Netherlands, with smaller increases in Norway, Canada, New Zealand and the US. In every country, the employment rate of women has risen, by anything from 10 to 35 percentage points. Finland is the exception here, partly because it had high rates of female participation even in the 1960s. Typically, therefore, the employment rates of men have declined over the same period.
Finally, of course, these employment rates have been affected by the dramatic fluctuations in unemployment in the 1970s to the early 1990s.
Underlying this relatively stable pattern are some significant changes in the employment rates of a variety of different sub-groups which we shall pursue below. Turning to the history of annual hours in Table 4 Australia, Canada and the US, the fall over this same period was between 100 and 150. These differences are striking and we shall pursue them further below.
In the next section we consider various components of the employment rate.
Aspects of the Employment Rate
First, we can see in Table 5 , how employment and inactivity rates differ across both men and women and different age groups. We focus here on the over 25s because we do not wish to pursue questions about participation in education.
There are a number of interesting features of 
Inactivity among prime age men
The history of this aspect of labour input is set out in So in the US and Sweden, the numbers more than double from 1970 to 1995 whereas in Germany they barely change. In the UK, they rise even faster (see Faggio and Nickell, 2003) .
Inactivity among older men
The history of inactivity among older men is presented in Table   7 , we present, in parentheses, the estimated inactivity rates were pension systems to be made actuarially neutral up to age 64. In many European countries, this makes a substantial difference. Duval (2003) extends this work and in Table 8 , we report the implicit tax rates on those working between 55 and 64 generated by the early retirement and pension systems. Then, in Table 9 , we show some of Duval's regressions simply to illustrate the importance of implicit tax rates in determining early retirement. For example, an implicit tax rate at age 60 of 50 per cent will generate a fall in participation of 8.5 per cent. In the parentheses after the 1999 column in Table 7 , we show Duval's estimates of the inactivity rate were early retirement schemes to be removed and actuarial neutrality introduced up to 64. Again, they show big effects for many countries taking the inactivity rates back to 1970s levels. Interestingly, by 2004,
we can see that inactivity among older men has started to fall in a significant number of countries, particularly those where early retirement incentives have been reduced, notably Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands.
Inactivity among prime age women
The overall picture is provided in Table 10 and this shows that there has been a continuing fall in inactivity among prime age women in nearly every country. But inactivity rates are still high in Ireland, Italy, Japan and Spain. Indeed, far higher than in much of Scandinavia in the 1970s.
Furthermore, whereas in the 1970s, fertility was positively correlated with inactivity across OECD countries, it is now negatively correlated.
So in the low inactivity countries, women not only work more, they also have more children.
Much micro-econometric work and the cross-country analysis in OECD (1990), Chapter 6 and Jaumotte (2003) suggest that marginal tax rates may be important here. So in Table 11 , we present the marginal rates facing married women at zero hours and when they are earning 67% of average earnings given their spouses are earning 100% of average earnings. Here, we see some significant cross-country variations, particularly at zero hours. If, by some mechanism or other, married women have their own tax allowance, their marginal rate at zero hours will be zero. At the other extreme, their earnings may simply be added to their husband's for tax purposes, so their marginal rate will be the same as their husband's. It is plain that high marginal rates at zero hours generate a strong disincentive to working a low number of hours per week. Even at more normal hours, however, there are large variations in marginal rates across countries.
The implications of these and other variables may be found in the panel regressions explaining participation in Table 12 . Marginal tax rates have important effects, as might be expected, with 10 percentage point increases in both the rates included in the regression reducing participation rates by around 3 percentage points. The strictness of employment protection laws on regular employment has a significant negative effect as does union density. Introducing measures of business sector labour productivity and male unemployment in column 2 has little impact on the key variables noted above. The negative impact of these new variables is not easy to interpret because they are potentially endogenous 3 . They are only introduced because they have been included in other work (eg. OECD, 1990, Table 6 .3 and Jaumotte, 2003, Table 5) and it is worth checking that they do not change the key results. The same argument applies to the inclusion of variables capturing public expenditure on children and parental leave. These will also tend to be endogenous but their inclusion has little impact on the marginal tax rate and employment protection effects. The impact of union density is, however, eliminated.
Overall, marginal tax rates and employment protection seem to have relatively robust negative effects. However, the time dummies in the regression in column 1 reveal a background rise in female participation by 14 percentage points and this is even bigger after we add in further variables in column 3. The implication of this is that there are further factors driving female participation which we are not able to capture.
Furthermore, looking at the trends in inactivity implicit in Table 10 , it is plain that there are large differences across countries. For example, there are very significant differences in apparent preferences about part-time work. This is important, because a willingness to work part-time clearly helps in obtaining a job. In Table 13 , we show the percentage of these who work part-time and the percentage of these who do so voluntarily.
Thus in Finland and Spain, few women work part-time despite married women facing zero marginal tax rates at zero hours. Furthermore, around half of these do so "involuntarily". By contrast, in the Netherlands, more than half the working women are part-timers and the vast majority of them wish to be so.
In summary, we can identify certain variables such as marginal tax rates and employment protection, which impact on the participation rates of prime age women. But explaining why the vast majority of prime age women in Scandinavia were active in the labour market by the early 1970s when only a small minority were economically active in Italy and the Netherlands, and why the changes in subsequent decades differ so much, is not easy on the basis of standard economic variables. In all the countries, there are a number of causally interacting trends among women going at different speeds in different countries -rising education, falling fertility, rising participation, rising expenditures on child care, rising productivity, rising wages. Sorting out these interactions remains to be done.
Overall unemployment rates
Since a great deal is known about the subject (see or Nickell et al., 2005 for example), we comment only briefly on overall unemployment rates. In This completes our discussion of the important factors determining employment rates. We next turn to hours worked per year by the employed.
Annual Hours Worked by the Employed
Despite the huge variations in annual hours worked by the employed 4 across the OECD, less is known about this than about employment rates.
As we have already seen in Table 4 , except for Sweden and Norway where female participation was very high, annual hours in 1970 were between 1850 and 1950 in most countries for which data are available.
Since that time, annual hours have fallen by anything from 100 to 150 in Sweden, Australia, Canada and the US to around 500 in France, Germany and the Netherlands.
We have already noted that variations in annual hours are driven, in the main, by holidays and paid vacations and by sickness and parental leave.
Looking over time, we see from Table   6 .1). Perhaps the most noteworthy point is that the US is unique among the developed OECD countries in having no legal minimum to annual paid leave.
Another contributory factor to changes in annual hours is the incidence of part-time work. This is not, of course, an explanation of changes in annual hours since it is merely one of the mechanisms by which the hours which people choose to work are expressed. In Table 16 , we see the history of part-time employment. In many countries, there has been an increase in part-time employment, but it remains below 20 per cent in most countries. The UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Japan and
Australia have a significant proportion of part-time employment, mainly among women. Southern Europe generally has the lowest level of parttime work.
Turning to sickness and maternity leave, in Table 17 we present information on the percentage of employees in receipt of publicly provided sickness and maternity benefit. Interestingly, in many countries we see that this percentage has fallen from 1980 to 1999. Then in Table   18 , column 1, we convert this into average weeks of leave which we then compare with some other measures. These are reasonably closely correlated although the fact that the average weeks in receipt of benefits exceeds the absence measure provided by Alesina et al. (2005) for the US suggests the latter is understated. Nevertheless, there are significant differences across countries in the amount of sickness/maternity absence and, presumably, a significant proportion of those differentials is due to the variations in the rules governing benefit payments.
So legislation on paid vacation leave and sickness/maternity benefits obviously has some impact on working hours, but what about the underlying forces at work, including those which drive the legislation?
In Table 19 , we present some panel regressions. Looking first at the tax variables, there is a positive impact on hours from the marginal rate facing women on zero hours where their husband is working. This is consistent with the fact that high marginal tax rates at zero hours discourage low hours jobs. By contrast, the marginal rate facing married women with working husbands earning two-thirds of the average wage has a negative impact on hours as might be expected. The same applies to the average tax wedge. However, the marginal tax rate facing a single earner appears to have a small positive effect, although it is hardly robust.
Employment protection has, if anything, a negative impact on hours, perhaps reflecting the fact that impressing managers with long hours is less of a requirement if jobs are secure 5 . Despite this, union density appears to have a robust positive impact on hours, consistent with the results reported in Bowles and Park (2005) , Table 1 , Column I. This is, however, inconsistent with the emphasis placed on the idea that trade unions encourage shorter working hours by Alesina et al. (2005) .
The strong positive role of earnings dispersion also confirms the results of Bowles and Park (2005) . In their view, this is strong evidence in favour of the "Veblen hypothesis". The idea here, espoused in The
Theory of the Leisure Class by Thorsten Veblen (1934) , is that households consume goods not only for their own sake but to impress their neighbours. This, of itself, will tend to raise working hours and if earnings are more dispersed, additional work effort is required to make the appropriate impression 6 . An alternative hypothesis, put forward by Bell and Freeman (2001) , is that increased earnings dispersion induces longer hours because it raises the incentives to work harder in order to get promoted and move up the earnings rankings. Whatever the driving force, there does appear to be a strong effect of earnings dispersion on working hours.
Earnings dispersion itself is, of course, influenced by labour market institutions, even when the dispersion of skills is taken into account. Overall, therefore, we find that various aspects of the tax system, employment protection and union density impact on working hours.
Perhaps the only surprising result is that union density is positively related to hours, even when taking account of its negative impact on earnings dispersion.
Summary and Conclusions
The data we have been analysing are summarised in Table 20, where we show the history of labour input in the OECD countries. Before discussing various stories, it is worth remarking at the outset that simply comparing the US with "Europe" is a hopeless strategy because European labour markets are highly diverse. A second point to bear in mind is that large macroeconomic shocks have distorted the labour input series for some countries in some periods. Thus, in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, there were particularly adverse macroeconomic shocks between 1973 and 1983. The same applies to
Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s. By contrast, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain were subject to strong favourable shocks in the 1990s.
The first story which is frequently used to explain cross-country variations in labour input is based on labour taxes, a recent example being Prescott (2004) . The evidence we possess indicates that taxes cannot be the whole story. The tax story is inconsistent with the tax effects on labour inputs generated by microeconometric studies and those generated by cross-country studies . For example, if we apply the tax data to the annual hours regressions in Table   19 , we find that the contribution of tax changes to the changes in annual hours from the early 1980s to the late 1990s is very small, probably less than 10 per cent.
A second story would be in the same spirit as the tax story but adding in all the other elements of the social security system including early retirement benefits, sickness and disability benefits, unemployment benefits and so on. As we have seen, these are certainly good at explaining the changes in some aspects of the labour input, notably inactivity among men, both prime age and old, as well as a part of the changes in unemployment and female participation. But shifts in annual working hours are a major part of the story and here, while labour taxes have a significant impact, they explain only little of the overall picture.
A third story is that favoured by Alesina et al. (2005) Broadly speaking, we can discern three groups of countries, AngloSaxon, France/Germany, Scandinavia where there is some sort of coherent story to be told about their pattern of labour input and the role of taxes, benefits, unions and other labour market institutions. But further countries, such as Italy and the Netherlands, do not fit into any of these three groups, and different explanations of their labour input patterns are required. Overall, while it is plain that the tax/benefit system and unions and other labour market institutions are important in explaining labour input patterns across the OECD, other factors are involved which are not easy to identify but lead to substantial differences from one country to another. Table F . Some alternatives to these data are presented in the Appendix. Vertical lines reflect breaks in the series Definition:
Total employment ÷ population of working age (15-64) Table C Notes: (i) The inactivity rate equals 100 minus the participation rate.
(ii) These data do not include those in prison. This makes little odds except in the US where counting those who are incarcerated would raise the inactivity rate among prime age men by close to 2 percentage points. ? refers to a significant break in the series. a = 1983. The figures in parentheses in the 1995 column refer to the estimated inactivity rate were the pension system to be made actuarially neutral up to age 64 (see Blondal and Scarpetta, 1998, Table V.6 .)
The figures in parentheses in the 1999 column refer to the estimated inactivity rate were early retirement schemes to be removed and actuarial neutrality to be introduced up to 64. We use the average of low case and high case in Table 3 of Duval (2003) . Source: OECD Employment Outlook. Table C, various issues, Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) . Tables V. 1 and V.6 and Duval (2003) , Table 3 . Finland  12  70  22  75  France  -38  56  83  83  Germany  10  48  24  51  Ireland  16  37  16  37  Italy  46  46  115  115  Japan  6  6  39  39  Netherlands  13  77  93  93  Norway  15  15  15  28  Portugal  4  52  14  76  Spain  22  58  22  69  Sweden  18  21  1  19  UK  8  22  14  22  US  5  5  5  5 Source: Duval, R. (2003) , Figures 4, 7, 8. 30 Notes:
To compute implicit tax rates.
• Define expected pension wealth/earnings at age R. 
total contributions to pension system over earnings at R .
• Average implicit tax rate . 5 / R DPWY = Table 9 The Impact of Implicit Taxes These include household income and social security taxes less cash transfers. AW = Average Wage. Computed using the tax rules of each country by looking a the tax paid on an annual income for the wife of X and of 1 + X where X is 0% or 67% of the average annual earnings of production workers, given the husband earns 100% of the average annual earnings of production workers. Author's calculations based on an OECD template. Notes:
Marginal tax rates: As in Table 11 .
Average tax wedge: This is the average labour tax rate, the sum of the average payroll, income and consumption tax rates.
Computed by taking the average tax rates from OECD Taxing Wages Statistics including employers' social security contributions and adding the average consumption tax rate ((Indirect taxes -subsidies) ÷ consumption) from OECD National Accounts.
Employment protection: An Index referring to regular employment. Details of its computation are variable in OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Chapter 2. The numbers may be found in the first three columns of Table 2 .A2.4.
Union density : ratio of employed union members to employees. See Nickell et al. 2005, p. 23 .
Business sector labour productivity : output (in constant US dollars) per worker in the business sector. OECD male unemployment rate : OECD Labour Market Statistics.
Real expenditure on cash benefits: Annual public expenditure in real dollars on family cash benefits per child age 0-14 times 10 -3 .
Real expenditure on parental leave: Annual public expenditure in real dollars on maternity and parental leave per child aged 0-3 times 10 -3 .
Real expenditure on family services: Annual public expenditure in real dollars on family services per child aged 0-14 time 10 -3 .
These final three variables were most kindly provided by Sakiko Tanaka. (See Tanaka, 2005) Source: Based on Tables 3 and 4 . Annual hours ÷ 52 x employment rate.
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